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"security Threat" Questionable At Best
by Deborah Tyroler
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Published: Wednesday, December 23, 1987
On Dec. 19, the Department of Defense made public a document delivered by Nicaraguan defector
Roger Miranda on that country's armed forces and military plans. The document, according to the
New York Times, "portrays a haphazardly organized and equipped Sandinista armed force that
is short of not only weapons and ammunition but also basics like food, clothing and medicine."
Moreover, the Sandinistas appear to be almost wholly dependent on the Soviet Union, an "erratic
and unreliable" supplier. The plan, translated from Spanish, is titled, "Primary Guidelines for
Functionally Improving, Strengthening and Equipping the Sandinista People's Army for the Period
1988-1990 and Preliminary Guidelines for the Five Year Period 1991-1995." The Times describes the
plan as a "wish list." Among other things, the document predicts "total" defeat of the contras by
1990, after which the US considering its long history of intervention in Central America may invade
Nicaragua. The US at this juncture would be faced with taking military action against Nicaragua,
or learn to live with the Sandinistas as it has Castro's Cuba. According to the document, defeat
of the contras would permit "a gradual reduction over the period 1991-1995, of the number of
unconventional warfare units," i.e., counterinsurgency units aimed at fighting the contras. The
document states that at such time, it would be necessary to begin building a more conventional force
intended to "avert the possibility of a direct invasion by American troops and assure their defeat
should the invasion occur." In the plan for conversion of the armed forces, many weapons sought
from the USSR are primarily defensive, e.g., anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft artillery, minesweepers to
clear harbors. The 12 MIG-21 fighter planes the Sandinistas wish to receive from the Soviet Union
were designed to intercept invading aircraft, although they can also be fitted for ground attack.
The document states early on: "It is vital to secure [from the Soviets] a supplemental order of arms,
technical support, material and logistics not furnished in 1985." The Sandinistas apparently have
a shortage in one type of rifle ammunition and too much of another. Next, the Nicaraguan armed
forces received the number of anti-tank rounds as specified in an agreement with Moscow, too
little of one type of rockets and too many anti-aircraft rounds. The plan states that Managua would
"request the annual supply of 16,000 tons of foodstuffs furnished to the Ministry of Defense by
the Soviet government," including flour, rice, sugar, condensed and powdered milk, animal and
edible fats. In addition, the document expresses the need for clothing, medical supplies, hospital
equipment and ambulances, and fuels and lubricants for military vehicles. Over the next two years,
said the document, the government plans to organize "100 new battalions (approximately 800
men per battalion) of local forces (Sandinista People's Militia), arming them with rifles." These
battalions "shall enhance the country's capacity for waging the people's national patriotic war,
insuring massive popular support for defense." In the 1991-95 period, the plan calls for forming
429 battalions of 800 men each in the militia, armed with rifles. The Times report states, "Contrary
to Washington's view of a Sandinista threat, such forces historically have not been effective in
invading other countries." Meanwhile, the armed forces would be upgraded with the receipt of
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, patrol boats, minesweepers and helicopters sought
from the Soviet Union. This upgrading would include equipping several light infantry brigades
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with artillery and transport for "missions that they are to carry out in defensive operations." On
Dec. 17, a senior official at the Pentagon acknowledged that evidence provided by Miranda of a
Nicaraguan plan to invade other nations was "speculative." At a briefing, the official also said the
US had no documentary evidence that the USSR had promised to furnish MIG-21 jet fighters to
Managua as claimed by Miranda. The official requested that he not be named. The Pentagon official,
who said he had served in the US Embassy in Honduras for a year, opened the briefing by repeating
statements of other administration officials that the US considered Miranda to be a credible
source of information. In those remarks, the official asserted that Nicaragua had a "clear plan" to
invade Costa Rica. The Sandinistas, the official said, would rely on a "fifth column" of sympathetic
subversives in Costa Rica. During a question period after the official delivered his prepared
statements, the official said the Nicaraguan Defense Minister, Humberto Ortega, had corroborated
that number in a speech last weekend. Asked why Humberto had spoken out, the official said
the defense minister had been angry with the defector, had felt betrayed and thus had lashed out
without consulting his brother, President Daniel Ortega. Asked about the alleged Nicaraguan plan
to attack Costa Rica, the official said Miranda had told US officials that it was not written down
but had been discussed at high levels in Managua along with plans to expand Nicaraguan power
elsewhere. The Pentagon official acknowledged that there was "no concrete plan" by the Sandinistas
to conquer any other country in Central America. Asked why the Sandinistas wanted to build a
large military force, even though it would be largely a lightly armed militia, the official said: "I don't
know." (Basic data from New York Times, 12/18/87, 12/20/87)
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